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ABSTRACT 
 
The claim that life is an emergent phenomenon exhibiting novel properties and 
principles is often criticized for being in conflict with causal closure at the 
microscopic level. I argue that advances in cosmological theory suggesting an upper 
bound on the information processing capacity of the universe may resolve this 
conflict for systems exceeding a certain threshold of complexity. A numerical 
estimate of the threshold places it at the level of a small protein. The calculation 
supports the contention that “life is an emergent phenomenon.” 
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PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The term emergence is used to describe the appearance of new properties that arise 
when a system exceeds a certain level of size or complexity, properties that are absent 
from the constituents of the system. It is a concept often summed up by the phrase that 
“the whole is greater than the sum of its parts,” and it is a key concept in the burgeoning 
field of complexity science. Life is often cited as a classic example of an emergent 
phenomenon: no atoms of my body are living, yet I am living (see, for example, 
Morowitz, 2002). Biological organisms depend on the processes of their constituent parts, 
yet they nevertheless exhibit a degree of autonomy from their parts (see, for example, 
Kauffman, 2000). How can this be? These seem to be contradictory properties.  
The problem of emergence – either explaining it, or explaining it away – has generated 
a considerable literature (for introductory reviews, see Holland, 1998; Johnson, 2001). 
Philosophers like to distinguish between weak and strong forms of emergence (Bedau, 
1997, 2002). Roughly speaking, a weakly emergent system is one in which the causal 
dynamics of the whole is completely determined by the causal dynamics of its parts 
(together with information about boundary conditions and the intrusion of any external 
disturbances), but for which the complete and detailed behaviour could not be predicted 
without effectively performing a one-to-one simulation. So a weakly emergent system is 
one that has no explanatory “short cuts” or abbreviated descriptions, and is therefore 
algorithmically incompressible in the Kolmogorov-Chaitin sense (Chaitin, 1987). The 
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fastest simulator of the system is the system’s own dynamics. Few scientists would 
quibble with the claim that life is at the very least a weakly emergent phenomenon. 
A strongly emergent system is one in which higher levels of complexity possess 
genuine causal powers that are absent from the constituent parts. That is, wholes may 
exhibit properties and principles that cannot be reduced, even in principle, to the 
cumulative effect of the properties and laws of the components. A corollary of strong 
emergence is the presumption of “downward causation” (Campbell, 1974, Bedau, 2002) 
in which wholes have causal efficacy over parts. Strong emergence is a much more 
contentious topic, although there have been many distinguished physicists prepared to 
argue for some form of it, including founders of quantum mechanics such as Bohr (1933), 
Schrödinger (1944) and Wigner (1961), as well as some contemporary physicists (e.g. 
Laughlin et. al., 2000). These strong emergentists are not vitalists: they do not claim that 
“biotonic laws” (to use Wigner’s expression) or “mesoscopic organizing principles” (to 
use Laughlin’s expression) over-ride the underlying laws of physics, merely that they 
complement them. Emergent laws of biology may be consistent with, but not reducible to, 
the normal laws of physics operating at the microscopic level.  
Strong emergence has also been advocated by some distinguished philosophers, such as 
Popper (Popper and Eccles, 1977) and C.D. Broad, who supported its application to 
biology (Broad, 1925): 
 
“I know no reason whatever why new and theoretically unpredictable modes of 
behaviour should not appear at certain levels of complexity, or why they must be 
explicable in terms of elementary properties and laws of composition which have 
manifested themselves in less complex wholes… And we have no right to suppose 
that the laws which we have discovered by studying non-living complexes can be 
carried over without modification to the very different case of living complexes. It 
may be that the only way to discover the laws according to which the behaviour of the 
separate constituents combines to produce the behaviour of the whole in a living body 
is to study living bodies as such.” 
 
In spite of this support, strong emergence is often dismissed as inconsistent with the 
causal properties of the micro-world. The normal laws of physics operating at the micro-
level are supposed to be sufficient to completely determine the behaviour of the system, 
and so leave “no room at the bottom” for additional biotonic laws or organizing 
principles to exercise downward causation on the parts. To be sure, it may prove 
completely impracticable to account for the macroscopic behaviour of, say, a living cell 
or even a protein by applying the laws of physics at the level of its constituent atoms, but 
critics of strong emergence retort that, in principle, such an account could be given. 
An operational distinction between weak and strong emergence is whether or not such 
an “in principle” microscopic account is possible, notwithstanding its overwhelming 
mathematical complexity. Sometimes this is cast in the language of Laplace’s demon. 
Laplace, it will be recalled, pointed out that the states of a closed deterministic system, 
such as a finite collection of particles subject to the laws of Newtonian mechanics, are 
completely fixed once the initial conditions are specified. Specifically, he wrote (Laplace, 
1825) 
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“We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause 
of its future. An intellect which at any given moment knew all of the forces that 
animate nature and the mutual positions of the beings that compose it, if this intellect 
were vast enough to submit the data to analysis, could condense into a single formula 
the movement of the greatest bodies of the universe and that of the lightest atom; for 
such an intellect nothing could be uncertain and the future just like the past would be 
present before its eyes." 
 
A strongly emergent system would be one that resisted prediction even by Laplace’s 
demon, quaintly re-named “an archangel” by Broad (1925): 
 
“If the emergent theory of chemical compounds be true, a mathematical archangel, 
gifted with the further power of perceiving the microscopic structure of atoms as 
easily as we can perceive hay-stacks, could no more predict the behaviour of silver or 
of chlorine or the properties of silver-chloride without having observed samples of 
those substances than we can at present. And he could no more deduce the rest of the 
properties of a chemical element or compound from a selection of its properties than 
we can.” 
 
And, by extension, the archangel/demon could not deduce the properties of living 
systems from their molecular components alone. It is this form of predictive emergentism 
that is affected by recent developments in physics and cosmology. 
 
 
MATHEMATICS, COMPUTATION AND THE NATURE OF 
PHYSICAL LAW 
 
Physics is predicated on the assumption that the fundamental laws of the universe are 
mathematical in nature. Therefore the description, or prediction, of the behaviour of a 
physical system is implemented by mathematical operations. These operations are 
necessarily idealizations; for example, the use of differential equations assumes the 
continuity of spacetime on arbitrarily small scales, the frequent appearance of numbers 
like π implies that their numerical values may be computed to arbitrary precision by an 
infinite sequence of operations. Many physicists tacitly accept these mathematical 
idealizations, and treat the laws of physics as implementable in some abstract and perfect 
Platonic realm. Another school of thought, represented most notably by Wheeler (1984) 
and Landauer (1967, 1986), stresses that real calculations involve physical objects, such 
as computers, and take place in the real physical universe, with its specific available 
resources. In short, information is physical. That being so, it follows that there will be 
fundamental physical limitations to what may be calculated in the real world, which in 
turn imposes fundamental limitations on implementing the laws of physics, even in 
principle. Landauer adopts the position that these limitations are not merely a practical 
inconvenience, but determine the very nature of physical law (Landauer, 1967): 
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 “The calculative process, just like the measurement process, is subject to some 
limitations.  A sensible theory of physics must respect these limitations, and should 
not invoke calculative routines that in fact cannot be carried out.” 
 
Recall Laplace’s description of his calculating demon: “if this intellect were vast enough 
to submit the data to analysis…” A demon inhabiting an idealized Platonic realm could 
indeed be “vast enough.” But adopting Landauer’s view of the nature of physical law, the 
demon would be obliged to make do with the computational resources of the real 
universe. Something that could not be calculated, even in principle, within the real 
universe cannot, according to Landauer, be regarded as a legitimate application of 
physical law. 
The foregoing quibble would not matter for our purposes were it the case that the 
physical universe possessed infinite computational resources. And there are indeed 
cosmological models for which there are no limits on the information content and 
processing power of the universe. However, recent observations favour cosmological 
models in which there are fundamental upper bounds on both the information content and 
information processing rate. A Landauer-Laplacian demon associated with such a 
cosmological model would perforce inherit these limitations, and thus there will exist a 
fundamental bound on the predictability of complex physical systems, even in principle, 
if one adopts the Landauer-Wheeler principle of physical law. The next step is to 
calculate what that bound might be. 
 
 
THE FINITE INFORMATION CAPACITY OF THE UNIVERSE 
 
In what follows, I use the word “universe” to refer to a causal region of space. I do 
not address the issue of whether space as a whole is finite or infinite. Therefore, I assume 
that the hypothesized link between physical law and the information capacity of the 
universe refers to information that may be physically processed and accessed in principle 
from a given location in the universe, e.g. Earth. 
 Using this definition, the universe is finite in standard big bang cosmological models 
because of the existence of a particle horizon. Causal horizons occur because of the finite 
speed of light, and this limits to ~ (ct)3 the volume of space within which information 
may propagate in the time t since the origin of the universe, assumed to be the origin of 
time. 
 Quantum mechanics sets a limit on the speed with which information may be 
processed by a physical transition, e.g. a spin flip. The maximum rate of elementary 
operations is 2E/πħ, a limit which would be attained by an ideal quantum computer 
(Margolus and Levitin, 1998). 
 A third fundamental limit arises because information must either be stored or erased 
in a finite number of physical degrees of freedom, which imposes a thermodynamic 
bound (Lloyd, 2000). A convenient way to display this is by combining it with the first 
two limits in the form of the so-called Bekenstein bound (Bekenstein, 1981): 
 
 kER/ħcS ≥ 1/2π         (1) 
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where k is Boltzmann’s constant, R is the size of the system (assumed spherical) and S is 
its entropy. The limit (1) is saturated for the case the case of a black hole, which may be 
regarded as a perfect information processing (or erasing) system. The information content 
of the system is related to the entropy S by the Shannon relation: 
 
S = k ln2.          (2) 
 
It is straightforward to apply the foregoing limits to a horizon volume within the 
expanding universe (Lloyd, 2002; see also Penrose, 1979). The total number of bits 
available within the universe at this epoch is calculated to be ~ 10120 if gravitational 
degrees of freedom are included in addition to all particles of matter. One may also 
readily calculate the maximum total number of information processing operations that 
can possibly have taken place since the origin of the universe within an expanding 
horizon volume. Note that the cosmological scale factor grows like t½ initially, whereas 
the horizon radius grows like t. Therefore a horizon volume will have encompassed less 
particles in the past. Taking this into account, one arrives at an upper bound for the total 
number of bits of information that have been processed by all the matter in the universe 
that is also ~ 10120 (Lloyd, 2002). 
In accordance with the Landauer-Wheeler principle, the enormous but nevertheless 
finite number 10120 sets a limit to the fidelity of any in-principle prediction based on 
deterministic physical law, and hence sets a limit to any constraint of over-determinism 
that “bottom level” laws of physics might exercise over higher-level, emergent laws. 
Expressed informally, the existence of an emergent law in a system of sufficient 
complexity that its behaviour could not be described or predicted by processing ~ 10120 
bits of information will not come into conflict with any causal closure at the micro-level. 
It should be noted that this criterion of permitted emergence is time-dependant: as the 
universe ages, the horizon volume ~ (ct)3 increases, and with it the effective information 
capacity of the universe. However, the recent discovery by astronomers of the existence 
of dark energy implies the presence of a second causal horizon – a de Sitter event 
horizon, in the simplest case that the dark energy density is constant. The entropy of the 
de Sitter horizon is given by 
 
SdeS = k×(horizon area)/(Planck area) = 3kc5/8G2ħρ    (3) 
 
where ρ is the density of dark energy, measured to be about 7×10-30 gm cm-3 ≈ (10-3 eV)4, 
G is Newton’s gravitational constant, and the Planck area ≡ Għ/c3 ≈ 10-66 cm2.  If the 
Shannon formula (2) is applied to the de Sitter horizon, it implies an associated 
information ~ 10122 bits. The fact that this number is close to the current information 
content of the universe is basically the same as the coincidence that, to within a factor of 
order unity, we find ourselves living at the epoch at which dark energy starts to dominate 
over matter.  
There is strong evidence (e.g. Bousso, 2002; Davies and Davis, 2003) that the de 
Sitter horizon entropy given by Eq, (3) constitutes an absolute upper bound to the 
information content of a universe dominated by dark energy of constant energy density 
(i.e. a cosmological constant). This property has been formally enshrined in the so called 
holographic principle (Susskind, 1995; ‘t Hooft, 2001; Bekenstein, 2003), according to 
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which the total information content of a simply-connected region of space is captured by 
the two-dimensional surface that bounds it, after the fashion of a hologram. The 
maximum information content of a region is given by this surface area divided by the 
Planck area, which is considered to provide a fundamental finite cell size for space. The 
de Sitter horizon, which is the end state of cosmological evolution in those models for 
which dark energy (of constant energy density) eventually dominates, saturates the 
holographic bound, and so sets an upper limit on the information capacity of the universe 
throughout its entire evolutionary history. Thus, taking the astronomical observations at 
face value, it would appear that the universe never contained, and never will contain, 
more than about 10122 bits of information, although the number of bits processed up to a 
given epoch will continue to rise with time. Such a rise will not continue indefinitely, 
however. The holographic bound implies that the universe is a finite state system, and so 
it will visit and re-visit all possible states (so-called Poincaré cycles) over a stupendous 
length of time (Goheer et.al., 2003). 
It has been suggested (Susskind, 1995) that the holographic principle should be 
regarded as one of the founding principles of physical science. Combining the 
holographic principle with the Landauer-Wheeler principle leads inexorably to the causal 
openness of systems exceeding a certain threshold of complexity. 
 
 
HOW COMPLEX MUST A SYSTEM BE TO EXHIBIT GENUINELY 
EMERGENT BEHAVIOUR? 
 
The numerical results of the previous section may be used to estimate the threshold of 
complexity beyond which there is no conflict between the causal determinism of the 
microscopic components and the existence of emergent laws or organizing principles at a 
higher level.  
By way of illustration, consider the oft-cited claim (see, for example, Luisi, 2002) 
that the enzymatic efficacy of a protein is an emergent property; to wit, that the said 
efficacy could not be deduced from an application of the laws of physics to a string of 
amino acids of 20 varieties. Is this correct? A peptide chain of n amino acids can be 
arranged in 20n ≈ 101.3n different sequences. Each sequence may assume an enormous 
number of three-dimensional conformations. A crude way to estimate how many is to 
assume that each amino acid can assume 5 different orientations (Fasman, 1989), so that 
the number of possible conformations is 5n ≈ 100.7n, leading to a total number of possible 
molecular structures of the order 102n. The information processing requirements to 
explore the chemical properties of each combination are negligible by comparison with 
the above numbers for even moderate values of n, so the predictive limitation is 
dominated by the combinatorics. Taking the cosmological bound as a lower limit on the 
“emergence of emergence,” we find 
 
102n > 10120          (4) 
 
or 
 
 n  > 60.         (5) 
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This is likely to be an overestimate of the size of the search problem, however, 
because the conformational information will be algorithmically compressible to some 
extent, and various approximation schemes may greatly shorten the computational task 
(e.g. Shirts and Pande, 2001; Garcia and Onuchic, 2003). Stable tertiary structures require 
conformations that are at least local energy minima – a tiny subset. Real proteins fold 
much faster than could be explained by their visiting all possible conformations, and so 
nature has found short cuts to discover stable conformations (although it is unclear 
whether this is a generic property of peptide chains, or selected for by evolution). A 
mathematical exploration of the biological efficacy of these molecular shapes is also able 
to take such short cuts. If the informational burden of the alternative conformations is 
ignored completely, the bound given by inequality (5) is replaced by n > 92. So the 
simple-minded analysis presented here indicates that the threshold for the onset of 
emergent properties lies somewhere in the range 60 < n < 92. Real proteins in fact 
contain between about 60 and 1000 amino acids, with 100 being typical for a small 
protein, so the foregoing analysis suggests that protein efficacy may indeed derive, at 
least in part, from strongly emergent properties. 
A similar calculation may be performed for genes. A string of n nucleotides of 4 
different bases may be arranged in 4n ≈ 100.6n different combinations, yielding a lower 
bound for emergent properties of 
 
 n > 200.         (6) 
 
Most genes are somewhat longer than 200 base pairs (typically ~ 1000). For comparison, 
a small cytoplasmic RNA gene in the human chromosome 7 is a mere 174 base pairs 
long, but it does not code for a protein.  
The fact that these numbers come out so close to the complexity of real biological 
molecules is striking, given that the limits are derived from fundamental physics and 
cosmology, and make no reference whatever to biology. The results suggest that the key 
molecules for life – nucleic acids and proteins – become biologically efficacious at just 
about the threshold predicted by the Landauer-Wheeler limit corresponding to the onset 
of emergent behaviour, and that therefore their efficacy may be traced in part to the 
operation of as-yet-to-be-elucidated biological organizing principles, consistent with, but 
not reducible to, the laws of physics operating at the micro-level. This analysis therefore 
supports the contention that life is an emergent phenomenon. 
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